Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital by Stein, Emily
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 48 Issue 4 Article 11 
January 2004 
Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital 
Emily Stein 
New York Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law and Gender Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Stein, Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (2003-2004). 
This Case Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
LANGAN V ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL
(decided April 10, 2003)
EMILY STEIN*
In 2000, the Vermont Legislature enacted a statute-the first
of its kind-that established same sex civil unions and afforded the
unions the same benefits as marriage.' Thereafter, many gay and
lesbian couples traveled to Vermont to obtain the greatest form of
legal protection available for their love and commitment. However,
it remains unclear to what extent, if any, their states of domicile will
recognize their union.2 New York recently confronted this issue in
the context of a wrongful death action, specifically, whether a
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005.
1. VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 1204 (2003). Section 1204 states, in relevant part:
Benefits, protections and responsibilities of parties to a civil union
(a) Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, adminis-
trative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.
2. Relatively few states have addressed this question. The Georgia Court of Ap-
peals refused to equate a Vermont civil union with marriage and upheld the trial
court's finding that appellant/wife had violated a consent order that prohibited child
visitation while she was living with an unrelated adult to whom she was not married-
appellant and her partner were living together after obtaining a Vermont civil union.
Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In Texas, partners to a civil union
sought dissolution of their union. A Texas district judge granted their petition, but
subsequently vacated the order at the behest of the Attorney General. Civil Litigation
Notes: Texas, LESBLAN/GAY LAW NOTES, May, 2003, available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/
usa/legal/lgln/05.03. Connecticut was also called upon to dissolve a civil union. The
trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion and the appellate court affirmed. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002), cert. granted 806 A.2d 1066 (2002) (limiting the issue on appeal to
whether "[t]he Appellate Court properly conclude[d] that the trial court had no sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a civil union entered into pursuant to the laws of
Vermont"). The Rosengarten court, as in Burns, refused to equate a civil union with
marriage and found that a civil union is not included within the meaning of "family
relations matter" as defined under Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-1. Id. West Vir-
ginia, however, ordered dissolution of a civil union in In re The Marriage of Misty
Gorman, which "[m]ay be the first instance in which a court outside Vermont has rec-
ognized a same-sex union created in Vermont." Fred A. Bernstein, The First Lesbian
Divorce?, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, May, 2003, at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/
lgln/05.03.
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"spouse" in a Vermont civil union can be considered a "spouse"
under New York law.3 Based on the established common law doc-
trine of comity, the court concluded that not only did the plaintiff,
Langan, have standing to bring suit, but that to find otherwise
would violate equal protection. 4 Significantly, the court utilized as-
pects of functionalism, an approach to statutory interpretation that
can be effective in achieving legal recognition of same sex relation-
ships, but that is criticized by strict constructionists as judicial policy
making.5 Here, however, principles of comity enabled the court to
3. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
4. Id. at 420.
5. Functionalism focuses upon the "[f]unctions served by the relationship at is-
sue . . ." as opposed to formalism which adheres to traditionally accepted meanings or
"formal legal definition [s]." Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the
FunctionalApproach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640, 1644 (1991).
The dichotomy between formalism and functionalism reflects one aspect of a larger
debate among legal scholars regarding the appropriate role of the judiciary in inter-
preting statutes. Specifically, the principles of separation of powers and legislative
supremacy raise serious questions as to the extent to which courts should be limited
when interpreting statutes. Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74
N.C.L. Rev. 585, 590 (1996) (examining "[b]oth the institutional premises underlying
different approaches to statutory interpretation and the institutional role of the federal
courts"). Originalists strive to remain faithful to the legislative intent at the time the
statute was enacted and employ a formalistic approach to interpretation whereby the
"plain meaning" of the text is paramount. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 2004
LExis 824, 16 (2004) ("It is well established that "when the statute's language is plain,
the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is
not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.""); Martin H. Redish and Theodore
T. Chung, Democratic Theory and Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in
Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1994) ("[tlhe fundamental objective of
originalist statutory interpretation is to give effect to the wishes of the enacting legisla-
ture."). Where the text is ambiguous, the examination of legislative history is resorted
to in order to discern the intent or purpose behind the statute. Difficulties arise where
legislative intent fails to definitively resolve the issue. Burt Neuborne, Formalism, Func-
tionalism, and the Separation of Powers, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 46 (1998) ("At some
point, formalism and functionalism become metaphors for the traditional problem that
we have in distinguishing between easy cases and hard ones."). The precise nature of
legislative intent is often difficult to define and the extent to which legislative intent
should be relied upon is debatable. See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or
Fabrication? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation by Willaim N. Eskridge, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
1329, 1386 (1997) (asserting that although legislative history may be difficult to discern
in some cases, it, nevertheless, remains an important interpretive tool); William N. Es-
kridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (describing approach advo-
cated by Justice Scalia in which plain meaning of statutory text renders an examination
of legislative history irrelevant). In difficult cases, courts often resort to functionalism
which is considered to be an aspect of "dynamic statutory interpretation." Heidi A.
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effectively incorporate valuable aspects of functionalism in its analy-
sis while, at the same time, adhere to precedent and established
methods of statutory interpretation.
In May, 2000, John Langan and Neil Conrad Spicehandler, re-
sidents of New York, traveled to Vermont to be joined in a civil
union. Langan and Spicehandler were involved in a committed re-
lationship for over fifteen years, during which time they lived to-
gether and were "as inseparable as any married couple could
possibly be."6 Both were the sole beneficiaries and legatees of each
others' life insurance policies and wills, respectively. 7 They planned
on adopting children and had recently bought a house when Spice-
handler was struck by an automobile in Manhattan.8 He was taken
to St. Vincent's Hospital with a broken leg where he died from an
"embolus of 'unknown origin."' 9
Langan subsequently brought a wrongful death action against
the hospital as Spicehandler's surviving spouse. 10 St. Vincent's
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Langan could
not be considered a spouse under the New York Estates, Powers and
Trusts Law ("EPTL") and thus lacked standing to bring suit."' Lan-
gan opposed defendant's motion to dismiss and moved for partial
Sorenson, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2120 (1993) (characterizing Braschi v. Stahl
Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), in which the New York Court of Appeals em-
ployed a functional definition of the term "family," as " [a] classic case of dynamic statu-
tory interpretation"). Supporters of dynamic statutory interpretation propose that
courts assume an activist role in order to respond to social change. See, e.g., id. at 2105
(arguing that dynamic statutory interpretation is an effective and necessary means of
achieving legal equality for gays and lesbians); see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Inter-
pretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L. J. 281, 317 (1989) (suggesting that the
principle of legislative supremacy "[d]oes not prevent courts from going beyond (as
opposed to going 'against') even clear statutory language and legislative intent," and in
cases of ambiguity, "[a]llows a court to consider any additional factors it deems appro-
priate, including its own view of public policy."); see, e.g., Guido Calabresi, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing judges should be able to "update"
anachronistic statutes in the same manner as they update the common law).
6. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
7. Id. at 412.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 411.
11. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 411. Under section 5-4.1 of the New York Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law (N.Y. EPTL), "distributees" of the decedent qualify to bring a
wrongful death action. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw §5-4.1 (McKinney 2003). Sec-
2004]
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summary judgment on the grounds that principles of comity re-
quired New York State to recognize his status as a surviving spouse
under the Vermont civil union. 12 The Supreme Court, Nassau
County, denied defendant's motion to dismiss and held that Lan-
gan has standing to bring a wrongful death action as the spouse of
Spicehandler.
13
The court first looked to the current state of the law in New
York regarding legal recognition of same sex partners and acknowl-
edged that same sex partners are precluded from bringing a wrong-
ful death action under the holding of Raum v. Restaurant Assoc.14 In
Raum, the First Department refused to find that plaintiff, the life
partner of the deceased, maintained standing as a spouse to bring a
wrongful death action. 15 The Second Department addressed a sim-
ilar issue in In re Estate of Cooper16 and declined to allow the surviv-
ing partner of a homosexual relationship the right of election
against the decedent's will under § 5-1.1 of the EPTL.1 7 At the time
Raum and Cooper were decided Vermont had not yet enacted the
civil union statute. Thus, the court distinguished Raum and Cooper
on grounds that when these cases were decided there was "[n]o
state sanctioned union equivalent to marriage."18 Hence, the Ver-
tion 4-1.1 (a) governing descent and distribution of decedent's estate includes "spouse"
within the meaning of distributees.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), appeal dismissed, 704 N.E.2d 229 (N.Y.
1998).
15. Id.
16. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797.
17. Id. Section 5-1.1 governing the right of election does not define the term
"surviving spouse." However, section 5-1.2 applies to both sections 5-1.1 and 4-1.1 and
thus, became the focus of both the Langan and Cooper courts' analysis.
18. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 413. Langan argued that Raum and Cooper are factu-
ally dissimilar in other regards as well. Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff John Langan
in Opposition to Defendant St. Vincent's Motion for Partial Dismissal and in Support of
Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memo.],
Langon v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 765 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 2003), p. 28 ("There is no
indication that the couples in either case [Raum and Cooper] had entered into any kind
of formal legal union, whether by registering as domestic partners or otherwise.").
Moreover, in Cooper, plaintiff was attempting "[t]o defeat the specific written instructions
of an otherwise uncontested will." Reply Memorandum of Law of PlaintiffJohn Langan
in Support of his Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [hereinafter Plaintiff's
Reply], Langon v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 765 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Raum, 675
N.Y.S.2d at 346 ("It makes sense to construe the intestacy statute's definition of "surviv-
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mont civil union statute and principles of comity provided the
court an opportunity to re-evaluate Langan's legal standing where
the issue arose once again in the New York courts.
Under the common law doctrine of comity, a state's courts will
recognize judgments and laws of other states, including marriages
validly celebrated elsewhere. 19 It is irrelevant whether a foreign
marriage is permitted under New York law. New York extends prin-
ciples of comity to common law marriages created in other states20
even though they may not be established in New York.21 Moreover,
a partner in a common law marriage from a sister state is deemed to
be a "spouse" under the EPTL for purposes of a wrongful death
action. 22 However, a state may refuse to extend recognition if the
union violates the state's public policy. 23 Thus, to establish whether
ing spouse" narrowly when the opposing parties are innocent heirs, and broadly when
they are tortfeasors.") (Rosenberger, J., dissenting). However, the court's opinion in
Langan focused solely upon the Vermont civil union to distinguish Raum and Cooper.
19. Crair v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 728 N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 2000). The Court of
Appeals described comity as:
one State's entirely voluntary decision to defer to the policy of another...
[and] may be perceived as promoting uniformity of decision, as encourag-
ing harmony among participants in a system of co-operative federalism, or
as merely an expression of hope for reciprocal advantage in some future
case in which the interests of the forum are more critical...
Id. at 977, citing Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y.
1980).
20. Black v. Moody, 714 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 2000) ("While a common-law
marriage may not arise in New York, New York does accord recognition to common-law
marriages validly contracted in other sister States."). Mott v. Duncan, 414 N.E.2d 657,
658 (N.Y. 1980) ("A common-law marriage contracted in a sister state will be recog-
nized here if it is valid where contracted. The law to be applied in determining the
validity of such an out-of-State marriage is the law of the State in which the marriage
occurred."); Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 414, citing Shea v. Shea, 52 N.Y.S.2d 756, 763
(App. Div. 1945) ("[m]arriage contracts, valid where made, are valid everywhere")
(Johnson,J., dissenting), rev'd, 63 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1945).
21. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2003) ("No marriage shall be valid unless
solemnized by either").
22. Black, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 30 (upholding trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for summary judgment on grounds that issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff was
common law partner of deceased and thus maintained standing as distributee to bring
wrongful death action).
23. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 414 citing Shea, 52 N.Y.S.2d 756; Crair, 728 N.E.2d at
977 ("[T]he determination of whether effect is to be given foreign legislation is made
by comparing it to our own public policy; and our policy prevails in case of conflict.").
To determine whether the public policy exception was applicable, the Court of Appeals
in Crair looked to statutes, 728 N.E.2d at 978, and judicial determinations, 728 N.E.2d
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
a Vermont civil union should be recognized in New York under the
doctrine of comity, the court engaged in a two fold analysis to de-
termine whether a civil union is analogous to marriage or common-
law marriage and whether recognition of a same sex union would
violate New York's public policy.
To determine whether New York's public policy precludes rec-
ognition of a same sex union, the court surveyed New York law. The
court noted that New York permits second parent adoption for
same sex couples. 24 Moreover, New York State has not enacted a
"mini DOMA" or a state equivalent of the federal Defense of Mar-
riage Act ("DOMA") which defines marriage as between a man and
a woman and permits states to refuse to recognize same sex mar-
riages. 25 Noting that the foregoing is not "[e]xhaustive as to the
rights of gays and lesbians under New York law . . .," the court
found that these statutes lend support for its conclusion that recog-
nition of a same sex civil union would not violate New York's public
policy.
2 6
The court looked to the legislative history and text of the Ver-
mont civil union statute to determine whether it warranted the
same legal recognition that accompanies marriage and common
law marriage established in other states. The court found that the
Vermont legislature was compelled by the Vermont Supreme Court
at 978. The public policy exception in New York applies to incestuous and polygamous
marriages. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 414 citing Shea, 63 N.E.2d 756.
24. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416 citing In Re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d. 397 (N.Y. 1995)
(The Jacob Court "reject[ed] a literal reading of the statute [Domestic Relations Law
§ 110] that would have forced the biological parent to relinquish parental rights.")
25. Id. at 11-12; see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (restricting the meaning of the terms "marriage"
and "spouse" to apply only to opposite sex couples). In addition to 1 U.S.C. § 7, the
federal DOMA also includes 28 U.S.C. § 1738C which provides that "No state ... shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State . . . ." In fact, the court questioned the
constitutionality of the federal DOMA, remarking, "It is unclear by what authority the
Congress may suspend or limit the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution .
Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
26. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416. The court also referred to the fact that the State
and the City of New York provide employment benefits to same-sex domestic partners,
id. at 415 (citing Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603, appeal dismissed, 727
N.E.2d 1253 (N.Y. 2000)), and New York City Administrative Code § 3-244, and that
New York State prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, id. at 416
(citing Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law § 291).
[Vol. 48
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to enact the civil union statute in order to conform to Vermont's
constitution. 27 In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court found
that to deny homosexual couples the right to marry precluded
them from receiving the same benefits as heterosexual married
couples, thereby violating the common benefits clause of the state
constitution. 28 To highlight the humanitarian and egalitarian im-
petus behind the statute, the court quoted a lengthy passage from
Baker, which states, in part: "The extension of the Common Bene-
fits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek noth-
ing more, nor less, than legal protection and security for their
avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship
is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our common
humanity."
29
Having clarified the purpose behind the Vermont civil union
statute, the court examined the statute itself and found that it "[i]s
subject to legislative control, [and] conforms in all respects to the
requirements for a marriage."30 Although the legislature withheld
the label "marriage," partners in a civil union "may receive the ben-
efits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
spouses. '"31 The Vermont Legislature deemed that "[a] party to a
27. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416 citing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d. 864 (Vt. 1999).
28. 744 A.2d. at 874 citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VI. n.6 (1777).
29. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416, quoting Baker, 744 A.2d. at 889.
30. Id. at 417.
31. Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1211(2) (2003). In withholding the label "marriage," the Ver-
mont legislature was responding to public divisiveness as to whether homosexuality can
exist within the religious institution of marriage. Legislative Findings 1999, No. 91
(Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 26, 2000, provides, in relevant part:
The General Assembly finds that:
(10) . . . Changes in the way significant legal relationships are established
under the constitution should be approached carefully, combining respect
for the community and cultural institutions most affected with a commit-
ment to the constitutional rights involved. Granting benefits and protec-
tions to same-sex couples through a system of civil unions will provide due
respect for tradition and long-standing social institutions ...
(11) The constitutional principle of equality embodied in the Common
Benefits Clause is compatible with the freedom of religious belief and wor-
ship guaranteed in Chapter I, Article 3rd of the state constitution. Ex-
tending the benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples
through a system of civil unions preserves the fundamental constitutional
right of each of the multitude of religious faiths in Vermont to choose
freely and without state interference to whom to grant the religious status,
2004]
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civil union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms
'spouse,' 'family,' . . . and other terms that denote the spousal rela-
tionship, as those terms are used throughout the law." 32 Further-
more, partners to a civil union maintain standing to bring a
wrongful death action in Vermont. 33 Hence, the ultimate question
became one of statutory interpretation, specifically, whether Lan-
gan, a spouse under Vermont law, could also be considered a
spouse under the New York EPTL.
Prior to the enactment of the Vermont civil union statute, the
First Department confronted the same issue in Raum.34 There the
court concluded that it is "clear and preclusive" that section 5-1.2 of
the EPTL defines a "surviving spouse" as "a husband or wife." 35 In
declining to expand the definition to include a lifelong same sex
partnership, the Raum court rejected the functional approach to
sacrament or blessing of marriage under the rules, practices or traditions of
such faith.
See also, Domestic Relations - Same-Sex Couples - Vermont Creates System of Civil Unions, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1424-25 (2001) ("By keeping the marriage questions independent
of the issue of material benefits and taking opposite positions on the tangible and sym-
bolic aspects of civil unions, the legislature was able both to satisfy many gay rights
supporters and to win over some undecided citizens.").
32. Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1204(b).
33. Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1204 (e)(2).
34. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
35. Id. at 370. With regard to a wrongful death action, section 5-1.2 of the EPTL is
the only section that purports to define the term "spouse." This section is applicable to
section 4-1.1 defining distributees. Distributees qualify to bring a wrongful death action
under section 5-4.1. Section 5-1.2 states, in relevant part:
A husband or wife is a surviving spouse within the meaning, and for pur-
poses of 4-1.1, 5-1.1, 5-1.1-A, 5-1.3, 5-3.1 and 5-4.4, unless it is established
satisfactorily to the court having jurisdiction of the action or proceeding
that:
(1) A final decree or judgment of divorce, of annulment... was in
effect when the deceased spouse died.
(2) The marriage was void as incestuous... bigamous ... or a prohib-
ited marriage ...
(3) The spouse had procured outside of this state a final decree or
judgment of divorce form the deceased spouse ...
(4) A final decree or judgment of separation ... was in effect when
the deceased spouse died.
(5) The spouse abandoned the deceased spouse, and such abandon-
ment continued until the time of death.
(6) A spouse who, having the duty to support the other spouse, failed
or refused to provide for such spouse ...
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2.
[Vol. 48
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statutory interpretation urged by the dissent in that case. 36 The dis-
sent advocated the functional approach espoused by the New York
Court of Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 3 7 in which the Court
broadly construed the term "family" under the rent control laws to
include the deceased's life partner who lived in the same apartment
for over ten years.38 The Court looked to "l[t] he totality of the rela-
tionship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of
the parties . . ." and refused to find the absence of a state sanc-
tioned marriage, unavailable to same sex couples, determinative.
3 9
Instead, the Court maintained that "the intended protection
against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinc-
tions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in
the reality of family life.."
40
However, as Raum illustrates, adherents to formalism reject
functionalism as "[c]ontrary to standard canons of statutory con-
struction."4' The Raum court found that to grant an unmarried
homosexual partner standing as a "spouse" effectively redefines the
statutory provision, resulting in judicial infringement upon the leg-
islative domain. 42 The Langan court acknowledged the counter-
36. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
37. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
38. Id. at 53-55.
39. Id. at 55.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The Cooper court likewise looked to a literal defini-
tion and found that plaintiff could not be considered a "spouse" based upon the
"[n]atural and most obvious sense..." of the terms "husband" and "wife" as found in
section 5-1.2 of the EPTL. Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
42. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The argument that the use of a functional defini-
tion in the context of applying family law to same sex partners effectively infringes on
the role of the legislature in policy making is common. See, e.g., Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at
408-09 (Bellacosa,J. dissenting) ("The failure of the Legislature to provide for the cir-
cumstances of these two cases.., is yet another cogent refutation of the uniquely judi-
cial authorization of adoption, unfurled today under the twin banners of statutory
interpretation and ambiguity."); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996);
Onofrio Ferlisi, Comment: Recognizing a Fundamental Change: A Comment on Walsh, the
Charter, and the Definition of Spouse, 18 CAN J. FAM. L. 159, 166 (2001) (employing a
functional definition of "family" may "[firustrate statutory objectives through over-in-
clusiveness and the over-expansion of statutory entitlements"). But see, Braschi, 543
N.E.2d. at 54 n.1 (noting that to accept appellee's argument that the term "family"
should be restricted to those in "legally recognized relationships based on blood, mar-
riage or adoption-may cast an even wider net, since the number of blood relations an
individual has will usually exceed the number of people who would qualify by our stan-
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
vailing argument "[t]hat at the time the wrongful death statutes
were written, the use of the term spouse did not envision inclusion
of a same-sex marital partner," but accorded greater weight to the
fact that perceptions of homosexuality have changed considerably
over time.
43
To underscore the shift in public attitudes and New York's
amenability to same sex unions, the court cited to Braschi, "the first
appellate decision in the United States to accord legal recognition
to a same-sex couple." 44 The Langan court provided an example of
how departure from restrictive tradition is appropriate by compar-
ing the current status of homosexuals under the law to the plight of
married women who, not long ago, were considered "[t]he prop-
erty of [their] husband[s] .'45 This powerful analogy reinforces the
premise that the law must conform to meet the demands of a
dard."); Ferlisi, supra, at 166 (asserting that the term "spouse" is better suited to a func-
tional interpretation than "family" because "[a] key function of a spousal relationship is
the romantic affection between spouses, the dangers of a functional approach [namely,
overextending] may be somewhat less acute"). The Second Department has been wary
of such judicial over-reaching and declined to extend the term "parent" to a same-sex
partner who participated in planning her partner's artificial insemination and raising
the child where petitioner sought visitation rights. In re Janis C. v. Christine T., 742
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002) ("Any extension of visitation rights to a same sex
domestic partner ... must come from the New York State Legislature or the Court of
Appeals."); In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (App. Div. 1990) ("Any
change in this area of the law must come from the Legislature, and not the courts.").
43. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The argument that the legislature "did not envi-
sion inclusion of a same sex marital partner" in the term "spouse," actually supports the
court's interpretive methodology as opposed to detracting from it. ChiefJudge Kaye of
the New York Court of Appeals stated:
Given the enormous volume of state court litigation, the unending array of
novel fact patterns pushing the law to progress, and the inability of legisla-
tures to react immediately to the many changes in society, I think it clear
that common-law courts interpreting statutes and filling the gaps have no
choice but to "make law" in circumstances where neither the statutory text
nor the "legislative will" provides a single clear answer.
Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1995) (discussing the importance
of courts as "interstitial lawmakers" in the ongoing dialogue between the judiciary and
the legislature in crafting state policy). Indeed, Langan presents exactly the type of
"[n]ovel theory of a statute's applicability to a category of cases unforeseen, perhaps
even unforeseeable, by the legislature," Kaye, supra, which "[c]all[s] upon judge[s] to
fill the gaps-and to do so by reference to social justice."
44. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13, quoting Arthur S. Leonard, Ten Propositions
about Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partners, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 343, 354 (2001).
45. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
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changing society and recognizes that "[c]oncepts of marriage
evolve over time . . .," not only with regard to the status of women,
but, also, homosexuals.
46
Not only did the court look to the broad realities of social
change, but, also, to the specific realities of the lives of Langan and
Spicehandler. The court emphasized that Langan and Spicehan-
dler conducted their lives in every aspect as a married couple and
focused upon the ways in which Langan and Spicehandler "func-
tioned" in their relationship as traditional spouses. 4 7 Such a fact
intensive analysis48 is implicitly based upon the test utilized in Bras-
chi in which the "totality of the relationship . . .control [s] .49
A functional approach to statutory construction involves look-
ing beyond the ordinary meaning of the term itself to the ultimate
aim of the statute. 50  The dissent in Raum asserted that
"[p]recedent exists for preferring a functional over a literal inter-
pretation of a statute whose purpose is to promote the public wel-
fare, so that homosexual couples will not be disadvantaged by their
inability to give their relationship legal status."51 Among the prece-
dent to which the dissent referred was the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in In reJacob,52 an adoption case in which the court found that
while "[t]he adoption statute must be strictly construed ... [w]hat
46. Id.
47. Id. at 412-13.
48. In support of his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Langan submitted his
and Spicehandler's wills, health care proxies, life insurance policies, photographs, cards
from family members, letters, and affidavits in which family and friends described their
relationship. See Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Langon v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 765 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 2003), Exhibits A-T.
49. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55. While the court quoted this aspect of the Braschi
opinion extensively, Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416, it did not rely upon Braschi in direct
support of its conclusion that Langan falls within the definition of the term "spouse," a
conclusion to which Braschi's broad reading of the definition of "family" lends addi-
tional support. Instead, the court only referenced Braschi in support of its policy analy-
sis, perhaps to purposely distance its holding from the "functional" analysis employed
in Braschi.
50. See, e.g., Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54 (finding a functional "[d]efinition of 'fam-
ily' is consistent with both of the competing purposes of the rent-control laws: the
protection of individuals from sudden dislocation and the gradual transition to a free
market system"); see, e.g., Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 397 (finding the purpose of the adoption
statute to protect the best interests of the child).
51. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 344 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
52. 660 N.E.2d at 399.
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is to be construed strictly and applied rigorously in this sensitive
area of law, however, is legislative purpose as well as legislative lan-
guage. 5 3 The Jacob court awarded second parent adoption rights
to a same sex partner emphasizing that this result most effectively
achieved the underlying purpose of the statute-to obtain "[t]he
best possible home for a child.
'54
In adopting the Jacob court's approach, the court in Langan
reiterated that the purpose behind the wrongful death statute is
"[t]o compensate the victim's dependants, [and] to punish and de-
ter tortfeasors .... -55 Based on the fact that Langan and Spicehan-
dler were financially interdependent and were subject to the same
obligations as married couples under Vermont law, the court con-
cluded that to grant Langan standing would conform to the pur-
pose of the wrongful death statute to compensate decedent's
immediate family.
The court then focused upon the last potential bar to granting
Langan standing-the meaning of the term "spouse" within the
EPTL. The court framed the question as " [w] hether the EPTL § 4-
1.1 excludes spouses . . . because they are both men or both
women."56 As in Cooper, the court focused on section 5-1.2 of the
EPTL which states, in relevant part:
A husband or wife is a surviving spouse within the mean-
ing, and for purposes of 4-1.1, 5-1.1, 5-1.1-A, 5-1.3, 5-3.1
and 5-4.4, unless it is established satisfactorily to the court
having jurisdiction of the action or proceeding that:
(1) A final decree or judgment of divorce, of annul-
ment... was in effect when the deceased spouse died.
(2) The marriage was void as incestuous .. .biga-
mous ... or a prohibited marriage...
(3) The spouse had procured outside of this state a
final decree or judgment of divorce form the deceased
spouse ...
(4) A final decree or judgment of separation.., was
in effect when the deceased spouse died.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 419, quoting Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (Rosenberger,
J. dissenting).
56. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
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(5) The spouse abandoned the deceased spouse,
and such abandonment continued until the time of
death.
(6) A spouse who, having the duty to support the
other spouse, failed or refused to provide for such spouse
However, in Cooper, the court only examined the first few words
of the section and concluded that the phrase "A husband or wife"
excludes same sex partners based upon the "ordinary and accepted
meaning" of the terms.5 7 Unlike Cooper, the Langan court refused
to isolate the phrase "A husband or wife" from the subsequent text
of the provision. Instead, the court found the section in its entirety
serves to disqualify those from surviving spouse status whose mar-
riage is not " [i] ntact and functioning."58 The court concluded that
"[t]he terms husband and wife appear descriptive rather than ex-
clusionary, based upon the section's focus upon disqualification"
and refused to find that the terms "husband" and "wife" alone oper-
ated to define "spouse" and deny Langan standing. 59 Moreover, be-
cause the Vermont statute employed the term spouse,60 "a gender
neutral word,"61 the court found that its reading of the term is not
contrary to the well established canon of statutory interpretation
that " [t] he very language of the statute must be fairly susceptible of
such an interpretation[.] "62 The court directly addressed the First
Department's rejection of a functional approach in Raum by clarify-
ing that "[t]his court does not address a 'functional' definition of
spouse, an approach disapproved of in Raum. Plaintiff is a literal
57. Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
58. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
59. Id. The court's analysis illustrates a significant problem with relying solely on
the "plain meaning" of statutory terms-"[t]he meaning of a text critically depends
upon its surrounding context." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. Rxv. 621, 621 (1990) (critically examining Justice Scalia's "new textualism" in which
courts focus solely on statutory text instead of attempting to glean the legislative intent
behind the statute).
60. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1204(b) ("A party to a civil union shall be included in
any definition or use of the terms "spouse," "family," "immediate family," "dependent,"
"next of kin," and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are
used throughout the law.").
61. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
62. Id. (quoting People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1980)).
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spouse under the Vermont statute, not a functional or virtual
one."
63
The existence of the Vermont civil union between Langan and
Spicehandler not only allowed the court to assert adherence to the
"literal" meaning of the term "spouse," but also lead to the ines-
capable conclusion that to deny Langan standing would violate
equal protection. Because the Vermont civil union is as heavily reg-
ulated by the state as marriage, the court was able to distinguish
Raum on the grounds that Langan is not "an unmarried partner"64
and found the central premise in Raum "[t] hat unmarried couples
living together, whether heterosexual or homosexual, similarly lack
the right to bring a wrongful death action.. .,65 to be inapplicable.
In construing the term "spouse" as found in the New York stat-
ute, the court adhered to established canons of statutory interpreta-
tion. The court afforded the text of the EPTL the most weight, but
found its "plain meaning" ambiguous. As legislative intent was un-
availing as an interpretive aid, the court necessarily emphasized the
general purpose behind the statute and employed a functional
analysis. The court acknowledged the impact of changes in public
attitudes toward sexuality, examined the reality of Langan and
Spicehandler's lives, and underscored the extent to which they
functioned as a married couple. Ultimately, the court applied the
term "spouse" to Langan to achieve the underlying purpose of the
wrongful death statute.
The decision in Langan is limited to whether plaintiff is a
spouse solely for purposes of the wrongful death statute. However,
this decision, as one of first impression, reflects the manner in
which another state's legislation can provide the impetus for a re-
evaluation of the legitimacy of same-sex couples elsewhere. 66 The
63. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
64. Id.
65. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
66. The greatest advances in achieving equality for same-sex couples have oc-
curred at the state level. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (holding that precluding same sex partners from marrying violates the
Massachusetts constitution); see Developments in the Law: II. Inching Down the Aisle: Differ-
ing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2014 ("[f]ederal intransigence may prove less significant than what
happens at the state and local level, given the federal government's traditional defer-
ence to the states in the regulation of 'family matters.' "). Cf 1 U.S.C. § 7 (restricting
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Vermont civil union and principles of comity afforded the court an
opportunity to acknowledge the realities of Langan and Spicehan-
dler's lives and legitimize same sex relationships under the law.
Langan reveals the limits of strict statutory construction and dem-
onstrates the efficaciousness of utilizing multiple interpretive
methods.
the meaning of the terms "marriage" and "spouse" to only opposite sex couples); cf 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (providing that "[n]o state ... shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relation-
ship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State").
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